Cryptography Research, Inc.

A request associated with one or more privileges assigned to a first entity may be received. Each of the one or more privileges may correspond to an operation of an integrated circuit. Information corresponding to the first entity and stored in a memory that is associated with the integrated circuit may be identified. Furthermore, the memory may be programmed to modify the information stored in the memory that is associated with the integrated circuit in response to the request associated with the one or more privileges assigned to the first entity.

A secret key value that is inaccessible to software is scrambled according to registers consisting of one-time programmable (OTP) bits. A first OTP register is used to change the scrambling of the secret key value whenever a lifecycle event occurs. A second OTP register is used to undo the change in the scrambling of the secret key. A third OTP register is used to affect a permanent change to the scrambling of the secret key. The scrambled values of the secret key (whether changed or unchanged) are used as seeds to produce keys for cryptographic operations by a device.

Systems and methods for protecting from external monitoring attacks cryptographic data processing operations involving computation of a universal polynomial hash function, such as GHASH function. An example method may comprise: receiving an input data block, an iteration result value, and a mask value; performing a non-linear operation to produce a masked result value, wherein a first operand of the non-linear operation is represented by a combination of the iteration result value and the input data block, and the second operand of the non-linear operation is represented by a secret hash value, and wherein one of the first operand or the second operand is masked using a mask value; determining, based on the mask value, a mask correction value; and producing a new iteration result value by applying the mask correction value to the masked result value.

Systems and methods for protecting block cipher computation operations, from external monitoring attacks. An example apparatus for implementing a block cipher may comprise: a first register configured to store a first pre-computed mask value represented by a combination of a first random value and a second random value; a second register configured to store an output mask value, wherein the output mask value is an inverse permutation function of the first random value; a third register configured to store a second pre-computed mask value represented by a combination the first pre-computed mask value and a permutation function of the output mask value; a fourth register configured to store an input mask value, wherein the input mask value is a combination of an expansion function of the first random value and a key mask value; a non-linear transformation circuit configured to apply the expansion function to a masked round state, perform a non-linear transformation of a combination of a masked key with an output of the expansion function, and apply the permutation function to the output of the non-linear transformation, wherein the non-linear transformation is defined using the input mask value stored in the fourth register and the output mask value stored in the second register; and two round feedback circuits configured to swap the masked round state produced by the non-linear transformation and combine the masked round state with the first pre-computed mask value stored in the first register and the second pre-computed mask value stored in the third register.

Described herein are technologies for application authentication and/or data encryption without stored pre-shared keys. In one resource controller, a processing device receives an application identifier (ID) from the application. The processing device provides a current nonce responsive to the application ID and provides the application access to the system resource responsive to determining that a hash of a current key received from the application equals a current tag. The current key is generated by the application based on code of the application and the current nonce. The current tag was previously provided from the application to the resource controller. The current tag can also be hashed by the application using the current key.

Systems and methods for performing modular inversion operations in a manner protected from external monitoring attacks. An example method comprises: determining, by a processor, a first masked value based on a public cryptographic key and a first random integer value; determining a second masked value based on the public cryptographic key and a second random integer value, and determining, based on the first masked value and the second masked value, a private cryptographic key represented by a modular inversion of the public cryptographic key.

A table key capable of decrypting a first table from a plurality of encrypted tables may be received. Each of the encrypted tables may include at least one pair of values corresponding to a challenge value and a response value. A request to authenticate a secondary device may be received and in response to the request to authenticate the secondary device, a challenge value obtained by using the table key to decrypt an entry in the first table may be transmitted to the secondary device. A second challenge value may be transmitted to the secondary device and a cryptographic proof may be received from the secondary device. The validity of the cryptographic proof received from the secondary device may be authenticated based on the second challenge value and the response value obtained by using the table key to decrypt the entry in the first table.

Systems and methods for performing cryptographic data processing operations in a manner resistant to external monitoring attacks. An example method may comprise: executing, by a processing device, a first data manipulation instruction, the first data manipulation instruction affecting a state of the processing device; executing a second data manipulation instruction, the second data manipulation instruction interacting with said internal state; and breaking a detectable interaction of the first data manipulation instruction and the second data manipulation instruction by executing a third data manipulation instruction utilizing an unpredictable data item.